Showing posts with label IEDs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IEDs. Show all posts

Monday, November 1, 2010

Dispute Over $44 Million Contract Shows War Dogs Are Now Big Business

Contracts for providing the military with explosives, narcotics, and cadaver detection dogs, as well as patrol and sentry dogs, are becoming lucrative, with one contract reaching $44 million and another, just a month ago, $34 million, both going to the same contractor. With success comes competition, however, and with competition come disputes, with disputes come lawsuits, and lawsuits mean work for lawyers, unquestionably a good thing. (One must pay homage to one's guild from time to time.)

What the Army Expects from Dog Team Contractors

Contract working dogs (CWDs) are to be distinguished from military working dogs (MWDs) owned by the military. CWDs are provided by contractors as patrol dogs, narcotics detector dogs, and explosives detector dogs for work at Kandahar Airfield and throughout southern Afghanistan. There were at least 220 CWD dog teams in Afghanistan by July 2010, and the number is rapidly increasing. The picture shows a CWD team posted on an Army website.

To meet CWD contract requirements, dogs must be at least one year old and no more than seven years, and “similar in size to the German Sheppard,” though other breeds are permissible. Contractors are responsible for off-post kenneling, meaning that the U.S. Army Military Kennel Master does not provide kennel services. Each dog is to be deployed with a dog crate that can be used as a temporary kennel when necessary. Travel is paid for by the contractor, even on military planes. Naturally, such costs would be factored into contractors' bids.

Explosive detector dogs (EDDs) sent to Afghanistan must maintain a 95% proficiency rating in detecting a specified list of explosives:
  • Commercial dynamite (Gelatin and Ammonium Nitrate)
  • Military dynamite
  • Water gel (TOVEX)
  • TNT
  • Smokeless powder
  • C-4
  • Detonating cord
  • Potassium chlorate
  • Sodium chlorate

Canine Explosive Scent Kits (CESKs) are provided by the Army. If other explosives come into common usage by enemy forces in Afghanistan, contractors have at least 30 days to attain detection proficiency once the explosives are identified. Certification of dogs to the 95% proficiency level is made by an Army official (CJTF-101 MWD Program Manager). In a Federal Claims Court case described below, it was revealed that in 2008 the Army had only one person acting as a canine certification authority in Afghanistan.

Narcotics detector dogs are to maintain a 90% proficiency level (5% lower than EDDs), and must be able to detect concealed marijuana, hashish, heroin, and cocaine.

Patrol dogs must be able to stay at heel off-leash and attack only on the command, GET HIM. They must be trained to attack a person wearing an arm protector positioned at least 40 feet away, using a bite and hold method. Dogs can attack without command if a subdued person attacks the handler or the dog itself. On the command OUT, the dog must cease pursuit and return to the handler if commanded to HEEL. The description of services provided to potential contractors states that a patrol dog’s ability to continue an attack despite gunfire is critical. The dog must be able to detect the scent of a person hidden 50 meters upwind and follow the odor to the person’s location, and must also be able to detect and respond to a sound made by a person 100 feet downwind.

Four hours of proficiency training are to be provided by the contractor to each team each week. There is to be one handler per dog and the contractor must “replace lost capability within 15 days.” Contractors are to have contingent teams to replace a working team no longer deployed due to death, injury, vacation, decertification, or any other reason. Dog teams must be able to operate in “Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger Areas.” Canine personnel can be required to work “in excess of 10-hours each day, 6-7 days a week based on mission need,” including federal holidays.

The description of services specifies that CWDs need a diet significantly different from that of pet dogs and states that dogs should be fed “a food the same as or similar to, Hills Science Diet, NSN: 8710-01-415-6950.” That seems like a plug a marketing department should be able to do something with.

The contractor’s kennel master is an important part of any proposal submitted by a contract bidder. This person must have at least six years prior experience as a senior military or civilian working dog handler and two years experience as a kennel master. The kennel master participates in strategy sessions and must have “a valid and current security clearance SECRET, minimum, in order to attend specific Government meetings.” Handlers assigned to work with U.S. or Canadian Special Forces are also expected to have “SECRET security clearance for access to classified information from US, Britain, Canada, and Australia (4 EYES).” Handlers are to be certified and proficient in both long and short-barrel weapons. The contractor is required to supply uniforms that distinguish handlers as its employees. Performance Work Statement (June 5, 2008).

Contract Dispute Reaches Federal Court 

Disputes over a large contract began in October 2007 when the Army solicited bids for additional CWD services in Afghanistan (RFP # W91B4L-08-R-001). American K-9 was the incumbent contractor providing CWDs to the Army’s Special Forces in Afghanistan. EOD Technology, Inc. (EODT) also provided CWDs for use in Afghanistan, but not to the Special Forces. (According to a page on EODT’s website, the organization provides de-mining dogs for “local Afghan deminers.”) American K-9, EODT, and RONCO Consulting Corp. submitted bids. In December 2007, the Army awarded the contract to EODT. American K-9 and RONCO protested the award to the Government Accountability Office (Protests B-311008.1 and B-311008.2). RONCO has been mentioned in a prior blog (August 20, 2010).

Following the protests to the GAO, the Army terminated the contract with EODT and canceled the underlying solicitation, but then issued a new solicitation on February 10, 2008, this time specifying that in addition to the Army, the dogs would be supporting the NATO International Security Assistance Force Regional Command. The request sought two trained and certified patrol/narcotics detector dogs as well as explosives detector dogs (EDDs). The number of EDDs sought is redacted from the case where the dispute ended up, as are other facts perhaps deemed sensitive by the Army. Four offers were received to the February 2008 solicitation, The Army chose EODT (Contract # W91B4L-08-M-0232).

American K-9 again filed a protest with the GAO and again the Army stopped the contract, issuing a statement that it had become aware “of several problematic issues which threatened the viability of the solicitation.” Two days later, on March 28, 2008, the Army asked American K-9 to submit a proposal for a “sole-source, six-month bridge contract” to provide canine detection services. The Army entered a Justification and Approval for Other Than Full and Open Competition (FAR 6.302-2(a)(2) in the General Services Administration Federal Acquisition Regulations). The Army said that American K-9, as the incumbent contractor, was the only CWD supplier in a position to satisfy the immediate need “with no mobilization lead-time required.”

American K-9 was then awarded the contract on March 31, 2008, and EODT took its turning filing a protest with the GAO (GAO Protest B-311349.2). EODT’s protest triggered an automatic stay of performance on the contract, and on April 6, 2008, the Army issued a stop-work order to American K-9, but provided American K-9 with a three-month, sole-source “interim” contract. On April 8, the Army decided that the six-month, sole-source contract (W91B4L-08-M-0257) could proceed despite EODT’s GAO protest, saying that there were “urgent and compelling circumstances that significantly affect the interests of the United States and its Allies, and will not permit waiting for the GAO’s decision on the protest.”

EODT, seeing the GAO protest wasn’t working, filed suit in the Federal Claims Court.

The court began to sift through the evidence, including the history in the preceding paragraphs. It noted that after a certain redacted date, NATO would not be using CWDs in Afghanistan. Only the U.S. would be using these dogs. It was not explained why other forces would not be using CWDs, though the Federal Claims Court found that the need for CWD teams in Afghanistan was rising.

The legal issue boiled down to the Army’s ability to override a stay by the GAO, which required that the Army establish that the best interests of the United States outweighed Congressional policy. The Army argued that the CWD services could not lapse even for one day, noting that an EDD at one forward operating base had found a redacted but obviously high number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the previous year. EODT, in protesting the award of the bridge contract to American K-9, noted that it also had CWD teams in Afghanistan and could provide the teams required by the Army Special Forces without any delay.

The Army, apparently forgetting its choice of EODT in December 2007, said that it only wanted to use one contractor and that bringing EODT or another contractor in while it was using American K-9 would “negatively impact mission effectiveness.” Further, it said that use of two or more contractors would “disrupt the integrity of the teams currently working together” and “elicit disruption and harmful competition.” Apparently, the handlers of the dogs, if not the dogs, would inevitably get in fights just as the corporations for which they worked were doing.

The Army also said that it had only one certification authority for dog teams in Afghanistan, a Sergeant First Class (name redacted, of course). The Army said that this soldier could only certify a redacted number of teams a week. It was not explained why this soldier could not certify teams from different providers as efficiently as teams from a single provider given that the certification standards are those of the Army, not of the providers.

The claims court decided not to override the bridge contract but said that it could not be expanded from its six-month bridge status to provide American K-9 with a longer-term contract without allowing other bidders to make offers. The Army would have to open up the bidding again. EOD Technology, Inc. v. U.S., 82 Fed.Cl. 12 (Ct.Fed.Cls. May 15, 2008)

Dispute Moves to GAO Turf 

On June 13, 2008, a new solicitation was issued (RFP # W91B4L-08-R-0025) to obtain CWD services throughout Afghanistan for one year, with four option years. The Army anticipated needing 50 teams initially (Responses to Contractor Questions, June 24, 2008). EODT was awarded the contract in this round and American K-9 protested to the GAO on August 15 (B-400464, supplemented September 11), attacking the Army’s evaluation of the past performance of the bidders, one of the factors to be considered in awarding the contract. The Army agreed to reevaluate past performance. After receiving letters from the bidders, the Army affirmed its award to EODT.

American K-9, not to be deterred, protested again, saying this time that EODT had not satisfied the experience qualifications required by the solicitation. Among other things, American K-9 argued that the kennel master/project manager that EODT planned to use did not satisfy Army standards. The Army concluded that there was a deficiency but gave EODT the opportunity to update its proposal. The Army also asked American K-9 to update its proposal. EODT provided an updated resume for its proposed kennel master. Meanwhile, the Army also questioned American K-9’s proposed kennel master, saying it had “reason to infer” that the kennel master referred to in American K-9’s proposal was not the one that was going to do the work.

Whether the Army was questioning the qualifications of the kennel masters on its own, or whether some corporate espionage was going on between the bidders, is not clear from the documents publicly available. In any case, American K-9 protested to the GAO that the Army was conducting “results oriented” discussions because it wanted to give the contract to EODT regardless of the merits. The GAO dismissed this protest as premature. EODT had given a price of $38,350,935 for the work; American K-9’s bid is redacted, though said to be “approximately equal” to EODT’s. The Army again preferred EODT.

American K-9 protested yet again, persuading the GAO that the Army’s discussions had not always been meaningful. The Army had not talked to American K-9 about some of the deficiencies it found in the company’s offer. The GAO sustained American K-9’s protest of an award to EODT on May 5, 2009 (Protest B-400464.6) and recommended that the Army request final proposal revisions and make a new source selection.

American K-9 Wins (At Least for Now)

A U.S. contracting website lists the final award given to American K-9 as being for $44,775,558.79 (Award # W91B4N-10-C-5001 to RFP # W91B4L-09-R-0025), though the site contains a pdf of a contract signed by Mark Mahler, President of American K-9 listing the total award amount as $25,830,292.74 (Award # W91B4N-10-C-5001, dated December 11, 2009). The $44 million seems to be the amount most commonly used in press reports. A separate Defense Department website refers to the same award (at least by number) and states its amount as $15 million. The discrepancies may in part reflect guaranteed and extension amounts. Two news releases on American K-9’s website do not list the amount of the award but state that it was the largest CWD contract ever issued.

American K-9’s ability to land government contracts for CWDs continued in 2010. In August, the company was awarded a contract to provide cadaver/human remains detection dog teams to Iraq. In September, it got a similar contract for Afghanistan. Also in September, a contract from the Navy was awarded to American K-9 at $18,426,926, which with contract extensions could reach $34,659,851.

The price for dogs may seem high, but working in danger areas is costly in many ways. EOD Technology had 34 deaths in U.S. government contract work between September 1, 2001, and June 30, 2010. EOD Technology was the subject of some negative attention in a Senate Armed Services Committee Report issued September 28, 2010. Whether this had any effect on EODT's efforts to get canine contracts is unclear.

Additional sources: Abby Brown, Discussions Were Improper When ‘Discussion’ Questions to One Offeror Seemed ‘Contrived’ (June 8, 2009); Kara M. Sacilotto, Is the Game Worth the Candle? The Fate of the CICA Override, The Procurement Lawyer, 45(1), 3 (Fall 2009) (discussing the Federal Claims Court decision and other cases). To see what roadside bomb detection actually looks like, see the excellent video on the website of DiagNose.

Additional Notes. The Associated Press reported on March 17, 2011, that the State Department ended a $274 million agreement with EOD Technology to provide protection for the U.S. Embassy in Kabul because the company was not going to be able to begin performing its functions by May 1. EOD had been selected to replace ArmorGroup North America, whose guards had been caught drinking excessively and engaging in lewd behavior at barracks a few miles from the embassy. ArmorGroup's contract is to be extended until September 2011. The Senate Armed Service Committee has been investigating the role and oversight of private security contracts in Afghanistan.

On December 14, 2010, the Defense Department announced that K2 Solutions, Inc., of Southern Pines, North Carolina, was being awarded a $24 million firm-fixed-price contract for IED detector dog procurement, training, sustainment and conditioning, and handler training. The contract is also to include kenneling and basic care of the dogs. The Marine Corp will designated "team integration training venues," perhaps at Twentynine Palms, near Indio, California. Team integration occurs prior to deployment.

On October 4, 2011, K2 Solutions won an award for providing the Marine Corps with approximately 359 improvised explosives device detector dogs, along with training of 647 Marine Corps personnel annually. The contract (M67854-11-C-3015) award dollar amount was listed as $34 million, but the contract includes options, which if exercised will bring its cumulative value to $91 million. Training will be performed in Southern Pines, North Carolina, Twentynine Palms, California, and overseas. If options are exercised, work will be completed March 2014.  U.S.-trained mine detection dogs are working in Jordan on the Syrian border (AUD-CG-13-42).

Wednesday, June 9, 2010

Car Bomb Fragments Hold Enough Scent for Trailing Dogs to Follow Terrorists

A car bomb detonates on a roadside and destroys half of an American tank as it passes by. Parts of the steering wheel from the car holding the bomb and alligator clips from the bomb itself are recovered by a forensics team within an hour. A scent transfer unit is used to extract scent from the surface of the steering wheel and from an alligator clip. Three hours after the explosion, two bomb dogs arrive. One is scented to the gauze pad made by the STU using the fragment of the steering wheel. The other is scented from a pad created by the STU from the alligator clip. The first dog trails towards a village half a mile from the explosion site and into a small house where three men are sitting. The dog alerts to one of the men. The second dog takes a somewhat different path into the village and goes into a government building where it leads its handler to an empty office.

What are the odds that a dog will follow the trail of the man who drove the car to the location of the explosion by being scented on the pad created from the steering wheel? What are the odds that the other dog would follow someone who participated in making the bomb? The answer to each question is, according to recent research, better than 90% (94.3% under specified experimental conditions). What are the odds that a dog will alert to someone who participated in the bombing? According to the same researchers, 82.2% (somewhat less where trailing does not begin at the blast site). These results were obtained in a study conducted near Phoenix, despite the fact that decoys, debris collectors, cameramen, and researchers were laying tracks over those of the driver and the bomb maker before the dogs began trailing.

The research assumes that highly trained identification dogs are available (this is not explosives detection work) and provides a very strong argument that experienced canine-human teams should be available for deployment to locations where car bombs and IEDs have been detonated.

Car Bomb Experiment. A peroxide-based car bomb with a 5 kg charge of liquid peroxide and liquid nitromethane, boosted by a two ounce piece of C4 with an electronic blasting cap was placed in the front passenger floorboard of a pickup truck, along with a nylon bag and simulated IED componentry, such as wires, duct tape, alligator clips, and a metal box. Post-blast debris was collected by three individuals who were present at the start of each trial for dismissal by the dog. The post-blast debris used for human scent sources was the steering wheel, driver’s side, door, and the nylong bag. Scent was collected with a scent transfer unit (STU-100), run at the highest setting for one minute. Gauze pads were placed in glass jars.

Prior to detonation, one human target (called “Terrorist” in the study) handled the nylon bag and IED componentry, while another (“Driver”) was seated inside the driver’s seat of the pickup, handling the steering wheel and column, the driver’s side mirror and the door. Both targets then walked from the vehicle into the village, about half a mile, and then did a Y split and separately entered buildings. These targets carried GPS units to document their paths from the blast site to the end of the trail. The experiment was conducted in southwest Arizona.

Six other people were in the experiment area as decoys while the Terrorist and Driver were running their trails. Three camera crew members were at stationary locations, and two researchers were present for documentation. The canine teams did not know the identities of the decoy, the two researchers, and the two targets. In order for a canine team to successfully complete the exercise, the dog would have to follow the trail of the target odor, ignore non-target humans in the experiment, and identify the specific target without prior knowledge of direction of travel or the identify of the specific target.

Thirteen canine-handler teams were involved in various parts of the study. The dogs had been trained in scent trailing, not tracking, and could thus work at some distance from the footsteps of the individuals trailed. Dogs were from one year to ten and a half years of age, with varying degrees of training and experience. Seven of the dogs had been certified by the Bloodhound Handlers Coalition.

Trailing began about four hours after the trails were walked by the targets. Post-blast collection operations and repositioning of cameras laid cross tracks over the trails previously laid by the targets. The canine teams were started at the front bumper of the truck and presented with a scent source without any information on the direction of the trails walked by the targets.

IED Experiment. Improvised explosive devices can be powerful enough to damage even heavily armored vehicles (as shown in the Department of Defense photo above, an incident unconnected with the experiments described here.) The researchers created a roadside device from two 60 mm mortars, boosted with a two ounce piece of C4. The mortars were placed about 15 ft from the passenger side of a delivery truck in a hole dug by hand about 4 inches deep. A lunch pouch containing a walkie talkie, wires, and alligator clips was also placed in the hole to simulate IED componentry. Post-blast collection was conducted by 25 people walking a grid in all directions from the blast site. Here also the two individuals collecting scent were present at the start of each trial for dismissal by the dog. Debris used for scent sources were pieces of the woven handle of the insulated lunch pouch.

Prior to detonation, the lunch pouch and componentry were handled by two targets, one of whom, Target 3, walked a trail from the blast site into the village and into a structure in the village. Target 4 was taken to a stationery school bus, then walked to another structure. These targets were also equipped with GPS units. Two camera crew members were at stationery locations in the experiment area as were additional researchers present for documentation purposes. Again, the canine team had to follow the trail of a target, ignoring non-target humans, and identify the specific target without prior knowledge of direction of travel or the identity of the target.

Trailing began about three hours after the trail was walked by Target 3. The second part of the experiment began six hours after the trail was walked by Target 4. Target 4 did not begin walking from the blast site but from a roadside device at a school bus some distance from the blast site.

Results of Car Bomb Experiment. The researchers noted that the scents of both human scent targets were probably commingled on post-blast items. Thus, it was not considered incorrect for a canine team scented on the “Terrorist bag” to identify the driver. All canine teams properly dismissed decoys and researchers as target human odors, though one dog displayed aggressive behavior towards a cameraman and the exercise was terminated. The dog had been following the correct trail, however. In sum, 12 of 12 dogs followed the correct odor trail, but only eight of 11 made a correct identification at the end of the trail. Thus, 100% of teams followed the correct trail, but 72.7% made the correct identification.

Results of IED Experiment. In the first part of this experiment, both human scent targets handled the same IED componentry. Some dogs followed the trail of Target 3 and identified him, but other teams, because of a change in the wind, followed the odor trail of Target 3 but picked up the odor of Target 4 at a turn in the trail and identified Target 4. Both identifications were considered correct. No false identifications were made of the decoy and two researchers near the building containing Target 3, but one team did not follow the correct human odor trail away from the blast site. Thus, 91.7% of teams followed the correct trail and the same percent correctly identified the target.

In the second part of the IED experiment, ten of 11 teams correctly trailed to the area where Target 4 was located but only five of these teams correctly identified Target 4, while one team identified Target 3 (still correct because of joint handling of componentry). Two teams falsely identified decoys, which only happened in this part of the experiment. Thus, the teams were 91% correct on trailing but only 54.5% correct as to identification.

Summary of Results. Combining the car bomb experiment and the first IED experiment produces an overall success rate of identification of 82.2%, but incorporating the second part of the IED experiment as well lowers the overall success rate to 73.5%. The article says little about how the dogs identified the targets, but does mention that in two cases the handlers apparently forced identifications. There were a total of 25 correct identification and two false identifications in all segments of the experiment. Canine teams followed the correct trails in 33 of 35 trailings, giving a success rate in trailing of 94.3%.

The research study was conducted by three researchers from Florida International University. Allison M. Curran, Paola A. Prada, and Kenneth G. Furton, Canine Human Scent Identifications with Post-Blast Debris Collected from Improvised Explosive Devices. Forensic Science International 199 (2010), 103-108.

Perhaps some speculation concerning the evidentiary significance of this research is appropriate. Of course, the courtroom value of the evidence might be affected by whether it would be introduced in a military court. Quite likely, in a theater of war, this approach would be used to arrest suspects, but not to conduct full trials without additional evidence. The fact that there were 25 correct identifications and only two false identifications suggests a diagnostic ratio, for forensic purposes, of 12.5. This puts the evidence into a significant category and into the range of human visual lineups. The scent from the steering wheel, however, might be of limited value since scents on the wheel could be from anyone who drove the car, not just the driver who put it near the road where it exploded. Although the dogs might begin trailing at the location of the explosion, in a relatively contained environment such as a rural village, an argument could be made that other drivers might have walked near the location.

Additional Note. An article set to appear in the Journal of Forensic Sciences in 2012, by Shate G. Hoffman, Shawn E. Stallworth, and David R. Foran, Investigative Studies into the Recovery of DNA from Improvised Explosive Device Containers (2011: DOI: 10.1111/j.1556-4029.2011.01982.x), concludes that "recovering DNA from IED containers is a viable approach for aiding in the identification of those who may have been involved in an IED event."