Tuesday, June 15, 2010

Police Dog Bites Are More Serious Than Bites by Pet Dogs and More Often Result in Hospitalization and Surgery

Do bites by police dogs differ from bites by pet dogs? Without having thought at all about it, I probably would have assumed that the difference would come from the fact a police dog is often trying to subdue someone who is running away, while a house pet might be inclined to bite someone playing too rough or too long, or doing something else the dog doesn’t like. There are other differences, according to a trauma physician who looked at records of bite victims of the Los Angeles Police Department K9 Unit form 1988 to 1990. Dr. Meade also looked at bite victims at the King-Drew Medical Center, an LA inner city public hospital.

Police dog bite victims were bitten multiple times 73% of the time and hospitalized 42% of the time, while domestic dog bites were multiple only 16% of the time and resulted in hospitalization 6.9% of the time. Police dog bite victims were male 98% of the time and female only 2% of the time, while with domestic bites the victims were male 69% of the time and female 32% of the time. Children under 13 were bitten by police dogs almost never (0.2% of the time), while 74.8% of police dog bites were of individuals from 13 to 29 years old. Domestic dog bites were of children 29% of the time and were spread more evenly across age ranges. Police dog bites involved angiograms 8.9% of the time and operations 4% of the time, while angiograms were rare (0.1%) in domestic dog bites, and operations resulted 2.3% of the time.

Police dogs in the study were generally of larger breeds, such as Malinois and Dobermans, weighing from 70 pounds up. The dogs were taught to bite down hard, using their full mouths, including incisors in the front and molars at the back in order to strengthen their hold on a suspect. They were trained to “bite and hold,” i.e., not to let go until commanded to do so. Officers generally allowed dogs to continue to bite suspects as long as they struggled and fought to free themselves. This is called “bite until passive.” There were other differences. Police dogs bite the torso or limbs close to the torso, while domestic dogs more often catch a hand. The figure above shows the percentage of bites by body area, with police dog bites on the left and domestic dog bites on the right.

There were racial patterns. Caucasians made up 41% of LA County under the 1990 census but received only 7% of police dog bites. Hispanics made up 37% of the county population and were 32% of police dog bites. African-Americans made up 10% of the county population, yet were 60% of police dog bites. The article did not look at deployment patterns of police dogs and contained no discussion as to the disparity in the ethnicity of police dog bite victims. Judges have sometimes questioned whether racial factors might be present in the use of police dogs. See the dissent of Judge Logan of the Tenth Circuit in U.S. v. Moore, 22 F.3d 241 (10th Cir. 1994), questioning whether sniff searches at the Albuquerque train station might have indicated racial profiling. See also Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 27 F.Supp.2d 1053 (N.D. Ill. 1998), where the basis of a civil rights action concerned possible targeting of African-American and Hispanic motorists for drug sniffs.

Peter C. Meade, Police and Domestic Dog Bite Injuries: What Are the Differences? What Are the Implications about Police Dog Use? Injury Extra 37(11), 395-401 (2006). DNA testing has begun to be used to determine if a specific dog was involved in an attack. This could be useful in eliminating the need for rabies vaccinations in some cases. Brauner, P., Reshef, A., and Gorski, A., DNA Profiling of Trace Evidence--Mitigating Evidence in a Dog Biting Case. Journal of Forensic Sciences 46(5), 1232-1234 (2001). Matching a dog's mouth to bites is complicated as density of tissue and other factors can affect the bite pattern. See Bush, M.A., Thorsrud, K., Miller, R.G., Dorion, R.B.J., and Bush, P.J. (2010). The Response of Skin to Applied Stress: Investigation of Bitemark Distortion in a Cadaver Model. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 55(1), 71-76.

Wednesday, June 9, 2010

Car Bomb Fragments Hold Enough Scent for Trailing Dogs to Follow Terrorists

A car bomb detonates on a roadside and destroys half of an American tank as it passes by. Parts of the steering wheel from the car holding the bomb and alligator clips from the bomb itself are recovered by a forensics team within an hour. A scent transfer unit is used to extract scent from the surface of the steering wheel and from an alligator clip. Three hours after the explosion, two bomb dogs arrive. One is scented to the gauze pad made by the STU using the fragment of the steering wheel. The other is scented from a pad created by the STU from the alligator clip. The first dog trails towards a village half a mile from the explosion site and into a small house where three men are sitting. The dog alerts to one of the men. The second dog takes a somewhat different path into the village and goes into a government building where it leads its handler to an empty office.

What are the odds that a dog will follow the trail of the man who drove the car to the location of the explosion by being scented on the pad created from the steering wheel? What are the odds that the other dog would follow someone who participated in making the bomb? The answer to each question is, according to recent research, better than 90% (94.3% under specified experimental conditions). What are the odds that a dog will alert to someone who participated in the bombing? According to the same researchers, 82.2% (somewhat less where trailing does not begin at the blast site). These results were obtained in a study conducted near Phoenix, despite the fact that decoys, debris collectors, cameramen, and researchers were laying tracks over those of the driver and the bomb maker before the dogs began trailing.

The research assumes that highly trained identification dogs are available (this is not explosives detection work) and provides a very strong argument that experienced canine-human teams should be available for deployment to locations where car bombs and IEDs have been detonated.

Car Bomb Experiment. A peroxide-based car bomb with a 5 kg charge of liquid peroxide and liquid nitromethane, boosted by a two ounce piece of C4 with an electronic blasting cap was placed in the front passenger floorboard of a pickup truck, along with a nylon bag and simulated IED componentry, such as wires, duct tape, alligator clips, and a metal box. Post-blast debris was collected by three individuals who were present at the start of each trial for dismissal by the dog. The post-blast debris used for human scent sources was the steering wheel, driver’s side, door, and the nylong bag. Scent was collected with a scent transfer unit (STU-100), run at the highest setting for one minute. Gauze pads were placed in glass jars.

Prior to detonation, one human target (called “Terrorist” in the study) handled the nylon bag and IED componentry, while another (“Driver”) was seated inside the driver’s seat of the pickup, handling the steering wheel and column, the driver’s side mirror and the door. Both targets then walked from the vehicle into the village, about half a mile, and then did a Y split and separately entered buildings. These targets carried GPS units to document their paths from the blast site to the end of the trail. The experiment was conducted in southwest Arizona.

Six other people were in the experiment area as decoys while the Terrorist and Driver were running their trails. Three camera crew members were at stationary locations, and two researchers were present for documentation. The canine teams did not know the identities of the decoy, the two researchers, and the two targets. In order for a canine team to successfully complete the exercise, the dog would have to follow the trail of the target odor, ignore non-target humans in the experiment, and identify the specific target without prior knowledge of direction of travel or the identify of the specific target.

Thirteen canine-handler teams were involved in various parts of the study. The dogs had been trained in scent trailing, not tracking, and could thus work at some distance from the footsteps of the individuals trailed. Dogs were from one year to ten and a half years of age, with varying degrees of training and experience. Seven of the dogs had been certified by the Bloodhound Handlers Coalition.

Trailing began about four hours after the trails were walked by the targets. Post-blast collection operations and repositioning of cameras laid cross tracks over the trails previously laid by the targets. The canine teams were started at the front bumper of the truck and presented with a scent source without any information on the direction of the trails walked by the targets.

IED Experiment. Improvised explosive devices can be powerful enough to damage even heavily armored vehicles (as shown in the Department of Defense photo above, an incident unconnected with the experiments described here.) The researchers created a roadside device from two 60 mm mortars, boosted with a two ounce piece of C4. The mortars were placed about 15 ft from the passenger side of a delivery truck in a hole dug by hand about 4 inches deep. A lunch pouch containing a walkie talkie, wires, and alligator clips was also placed in the hole to simulate IED componentry. Post-blast collection was conducted by 25 people walking a grid in all directions from the blast site. Here also the two individuals collecting scent were present at the start of each trial for dismissal by the dog. Debris used for scent sources were pieces of the woven handle of the insulated lunch pouch.

Prior to detonation, the lunch pouch and componentry were handled by two targets, one of whom, Target 3, walked a trail from the blast site into the village and into a structure in the village. Target 4 was taken to a stationery school bus, then walked to another structure. These targets were also equipped with GPS units. Two camera crew members were at stationery locations in the experiment area as were additional researchers present for documentation purposes. Again, the canine team had to follow the trail of a target, ignoring non-target humans, and identify the specific target without prior knowledge of direction of travel or the identity of the target.

Trailing began about three hours after the trail was walked by Target 3. The second part of the experiment began six hours after the trail was walked by Target 4. Target 4 did not begin walking from the blast site but from a roadside device at a school bus some distance from the blast site.

Results of Car Bomb Experiment. The researchers noted that the scents of both human scent targets were probably commingled on post-blast items. Thus, it was not considered incorrect for a canine team scented on the “Terrorist bag” to identify the driver. All canine teams properly dismissed decoys and researchers as target human odors, though one dog displayed aggressive behavior towards a cameraman and the exercise was terminated. The dog had been following the correct trail, however. In sum, 12 of 12 dogs followed the correct odor trail, but only eight of 11 made a correct identification at the end of the trail. Thus, 100% of teams followed the correct trail, but 72.7% made the correct identification.

Results of IED Experiment. In the first part of this experiment, both human scent targets handled the same IED componentry. Some dogs followed the trail of Target 3 and identified him, but other teams, because of a change in the wind, followed the odor trail of Target 3 but picked up the odor of Target 4 at a turn in the trail and identified Target 4. Both identifications were considered correct. No false identifications were made of the decoy and two researchers near the building containing Target 3, but one team did not follow the correct human odor trail away from the blast site. Thus, 91.7% of teams followed the correct trail and the same percent correctly identified the target.

In the second part of the IED experiment, ten of 11 teams correctly trailed to the area where Target 4 was located but only five of these teams correctly identified Target 4, while one team identified Target 3 (still correct because of joint handling of componentry). Two teams falsely identified decoys, which only happened in this part of the experiment. Thus, the teams were 91% correct on trailing but only 54.5% correct as to identification.

Summary of Results. Combining the car bomb experiment and the first IED experiment produces an overall success rate of identification of 82.2%, but incorporating the second part of the IED experiment as well lowers the overall success rate to 73.5%. The article says little about how the dogs identified the targets, but does mention that in two cases the handlers apparently forced identifications. There were a total of 25 correct identification and two false identifications in all segments of the experiment. Canine teams followed the correct trails in 33 of 35 trailings, giving a success rate in trailing of 94.3%.

The research study was conducted by three researchers from Florida International University. Allison M. Curran, Paola A. Prada, and Kenneth G. Furton, Canine Human Scent Identifications with Post-Blast Debris Collected from Improvised Explosive Devices. Forensic Science International 199 (2010), 103-108.

Perhaps some speculation concerning the evidentiary significance of this research is appropriate. Of course, the courtroom value of the evidence might be affected by whether it would be introduced in a military court. Quite likely, in a theater of war, this approach would be used to arrest suspects, but not to conduct full trials without additional evidence. The fact that there were 25 correct identifications and only two false identifications suggests a diagnostic ratio, for forensic purposes, of 12.5. This puts the evidence into a significant category and into the range of human visual lineups. The scent from the steering wheel, however, might be of limited value since scents on the wheel could be from anyone who drove the car, not just the driver who put it near the road where it exploded. Although the dogs might begin trailing at the location of the explosion, in a relatively contained environment such as a rural village, an argument could be made that other drivers might have walked near the location.

Additional Note. An article set to appear in the Journal of Forensic Sciences in 2012, by Shate G. Hoffman, Shawn E. Stallworth, and David R. Foran, Investigative Studies into the Recovery of DNA from Improvised Explosive Device Containers (2011: DOI: 10.1111/j.1556-4029.2011.01982.x), concludes that "recovering DNA from IED containers is a viable approach for aiding in the identification of those who may have been involved in an IED event."

Thursday, June 3, 2010

Attacking Probable Cause from a Drug Dog’s Alert: Look at the Dog’s History and Check the Dashboard Video

A Salt Lake City police officer was staking out a house for drug and gang activity. He checked the plates of a Cadillac parked in front of the house and found that it lacked insurance and its registration had expired. When a man and a woman got into the car and began to drive away, the officer stopped them. Two minutes later an officer arrived with a K-9 patrol dog with narcotics detection training. This officer thought the car matched the description given of a vehicle involved in a robbery. While the first officer’s questioning continued, the second brought his dog to the passenger side of the Cadillac, where, according to the handler, the dog alerted. The handler then allowed the dog, named Oso, inside the car where the handler said that he alerted to the front seats. He opened a fanny pack on the seat and found a Ruger semiautomatic handgun.

The driver, William Vincent Clarkson, was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person (1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm or ammunition….”). Clarkson moved to exclude the canine evidence based on the dog’s lack of reliability. The trial court denied the motion, saying that the officers reasonably relied on Oso’s alerts, and noting that in Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court said only that a sniff should be performed by a “well-trained narcotics-detection dog.” 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).

Clarkson appealed. The Tenth Circuit held that there was a reasonable articulable suspicion for the initial stop, the questioning of the driver, a pat-down of the driver to check for weapons, and the initiation of the dog sniff. What the Tenth Circuit was not satisfied about was whether the dog’s alerts (outside and inside the car) had provided probable cause for the subsequent search. The Tenth Circuit said that probable cause could not simply be established by the fact the officers had no evidence the dog was not reliable. The circuit court said that this would amount to a good faith justification for a search and “would minimize motivation for police officers to ensure a dog is actually trained or reliable before deploying it.”

The circuit court did not think it was asking for much. All the prosecution had to do was show that the dog had been certified, or that its training had been sufficient to reach a certification level. Oso had, in fact, not been certified, as an injury prevented him and his handler from completing the final two weeks of an eight-week training program. It would generally have been relatively simple to establish that the dog could do the job anyway but two things got in the way: the defense counsel was not asleep at the wheel, as too often happens with canine evidence, and the whole traffic stop was caught on video. These two factors merged when the defense hired an expert, Steven Nicely, who noticed that Oso’s alerts from the handler’s descriptions were not consistent with what was visible on the video of the traffic stop, where the dog seemed primarily to bark outside the vehicle and did not lie down inside the vehicle as the handler had described.

Nicely also noticed that the video demonstrated that Oso did not stay with a “closed-mouth sniff” through the procedure. Nicely testified that without actively sniffing, Oso would have been unable to properly detect drugs. Even more serious, Nicely suspected that the handler might have been cueing the dog to alert when they approached the passenger side door. The handler also told Nicely that he was thinking of changing the dog’s alert from a passive alert (usually sitting or lying down) to an aggressive alert (such as scratching or biting). That meant that the dog’s alert had not been fixed, which meant to Nicely that Oso had not received enough training.

The dog’s training records were apparently so sparse that Nicely could not form an opinion as to what the dog had actually learned. The district court held that the defendant had satisfied his burden of demonstrating that Oso was unqualified to serve as a narcotics detection dog at the time he was deployed in this case. The search of the vehicle was therefore not supported by probable cause. The handgun was suppressed. U.S. v. Clarkson, 2007 WL 2406942 (D.Utah 2007), 551 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2009), on remand, 2009 WL 1651043 (D.Utah 2009).

Nicely has become the bane of detection dog handlers. As far back as 1996, defense counsel in a traffic stop set up something of a sting operation to see if Illinois state troopers were targeting black and Hispanic drivers for traffic stops and dog sniffs. A private investigator involved in this effort was stopped and a trooper’s dog alerted, resulting in a fruitless search. Nicely provided a report that persuaded the court that the handler was not automatically entitled to qualified immunity. A recent Eight Circuit case quoted Nicely as saying that an Iowa state trooper was not a well-trained detector dog handler and his dog was not a well-trained detector dog. U.S. v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2010). Nicely’s testimony has not been restricted to narcotics detection dogs. In a 1998 Texas case, he testified that an accelerant detection dog’s handler was not training his dogs in such a way as to produce reliable results. Another witness argued that the dog may have detected mineral spirits, not gasoline. Fitts v. State, 982 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.App. – Houston 1998).

Courts have not always been impressed by Nicely, however. See U.S. v. Prokupek, 2009 WL 2634446 (D.Neb. 2009) (“The Court does not find the Defendants' expert, Steven Douglas Nicely, credible. His relevant experience is lacking. The other expert testimony clearly established Rocky's certification and reliability using accepted familiar standards. Rocky positively alerted and indicated to the presence of drugs in the car, and Prokupek clearly appeared under the influence.”). Even more critical was U.S. v. Olivares-Rodriquez, 2010 WL 1137498 (N.D. Iowa 2010), a case where the handler said the dog gave an aggressive alert outside a vehicle that turned out to contain cocaine. The dog jumped up against the rear bumper, gave a scratch, then repeated this action twice more. Nicely argued that the handler, by tapping the vehicle, and saying “Drugs, check!” was cueing the dog. The prosecution’s expert argued that the handler was just indicating where the dog should sniff. The court agreed with this expert, and leveled a jab directly at Nicely:

“The court further finds that although Nicely appears to have considerable experience in the area of dog training, his testimony in this case is not entitled to any weight. Indeed, his statement that he was 99% certain the dog just happened to pick up the boot where the drugs were located without picking up any scent from the drugs was ludicrous.”

Sentences like these will ricochet among litigators looking for experts in cases with canine aspects, and the district court’s assessment could reduce Nicely's value to the defense bar. I advise experts who testify a lot, and particularly who expect an income from testifying, be careful what cases you take, and don’t always work for the same side.

For more on how a dog's history can be brought into a probable cause hearing, see the decision of the South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Nguyen, 726 N.W.2d 871 (Sup.Ct. 2007). The court found three divergent views as to how a drug dog's reliability may be shown:

1. Jurisdictions deeming a dog reliable solely by showing dog was trained and certified.
2. Jurisdictions deeming a dog's training and certification prima facie evidence the dog is reliable, shifting the burden to the defense to challenge the presumption.
3. Jurisdictions that require or allow a dog's field activity reports, along with evidence the dog is trained and certified, to be considered in determining reliability.

The court also noted that a number of appellate courts have found the decision ultimately rests with the trial court. See also the Ohio appellate decision, also involving Nguyen, State v. Nguyen, 157 Ohio App.3d 482, 811 N.E.2d 1180 (2004).

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Let Us Now Praise Gerun Moore

Gerun Moore with Chloe and a nurse on his 100th birthday.
Chloe and I are a therapy dog team. When anyone asks as to who gets the therapy in “therapy dog,” I usually explain that we visit patients in hospitals, children in special education schools, residents in nursing homes, and so forth, implying that those we visit are the ones getting the therapy. Perhaps I also describe how Chloe cheers up the nurses, receptionists, janitors, parking lot attendants, and so forth. But I suspect that if I were honest, I should say that the first recipient of the therapy Chloe dispenses is me. My life has been vastly changed by Chloe, in more ways than I can count.

A case in point is Gerun Moore, a resident in a nursing home we visited for several years in Youngtown, Arizona. The second oldest resident of the home (the oldest still lives at 107), Gerun was soon one of Chloe’s biggest fans on our visits there. He became our first stop, sitting outside the nursing station, always happy to see her but happy to see me as well. He asked me about myself, about what I did, how long I’d had Chloe, and would tell me about dogs he had owned. On March 12 we attended his 100th birthday (it was actually March 13, but that being a Saturday they moved it up a day so more people could attend).

Gerun lived life to the full, and there were children and grandchildren, and more distant generations at his birthday party. He had grown up in New Orleans, where his father was a musician and played with the likes of Louis Armstrong and Bix Beiderbecke. Gerun followed in his father’s footsteps and was once a member of the Louis Prima Orchestra, living in many places in the United States during the seven decades of his career. He told me about playing at a party the night World War II ended. Gerun was part of history and I wish I'd heard more.

Gerun was not the sort of musician who let the jazz clubs turn him into a smoker or a drinker. He wrote a book, Numbers Will Tell, and found a second career in lecturing around the country on the strange findings of numerology. I once expressed doubt that I would live as long as he had. “You’ll get there,” he said, “just stop worrying.” There was wisdom in his gaze, but no guile. He looked into Chloe’s eyes with the same innocence and simplicity that she looked into his. He calmed her. He calmed me. Somehow we were always a little different after we talked to him, which is why we always began our visits by going to him.

Gerun died on April 11, 29 days past his 100th birthday. I wonder what he would have made of that number - one hundred years, 29 days. Perhaps I’d have to calculate the number of days from March 13, 1910 to April 11, 2010. If men become angels, Gerun is surely among them, tapping time and spinning riddles on the plains of heaven. “Such a good girl. Such a good girl,” with the rasp of an old crooner. Some believe that dogs have a sixth sense. Perhaps Chloe hears him still.

Thursday, May 27, 2010

Explosives Detection Canine Teams Increase at Airports and Rail Systems, but Coverage Is Still Thin

Finding hard statistics about government canine programs can be difficult. The Secret Service, for instance, considers the number of explosives detection canine teams it deploys to be sensitive information. Most government websites provide rather generic information with cute pictures of puppies that will be trained for various purposes, but say little about numbers and costs.

The Government Accountability Office has, however, issued some reports with useful details for those of us who want to get some quantitative data about canine programs. A report on the explosives detection canine teams deployed by the Transportation Safety Administration (GAO-08-933R) provides some details about the progress of the Department of Homeland Security in deploying an additional 200 explosives detection teams assigned to air and rail safety. This number is to be added to the approximately 425 explosives detection canine teams assigned to airports and mass transit systems in 2007, when the 9/11 Commission Act (PL 110-53) mandated the increase of 200 teams. The fiscal year 2011 budget of the Department of Homeland Security anticipates another 275 explosives detection canine teams, over 200 of which will be at airports.

The Transportation Security Administration’s National Explosive Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) assigns most teams to airports. In 2008, 370 teams were deployed at 69 airports, while 56 teams were deployed to 14 mass transit systems and railways. In 2009, there were 88 teams at 15 mass transit and rail systems. Assignments of teams are based in part on proximity of a rail system to critical infrastructure, so for Amtrak, for instance, the largest concentration of canine teams is along the Northeast Corridor. In addition to patrolling the facilities to which they are assigned, dogs also screen cargo and participate in joint missions, called Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) missions, which involve target deployments of participants from various agencies for specific objectives. Dogs are generally supposed to be visible at airports and rail stations on the theory that their presence may discourage terrorists and criminals. Cargo screening also includes patrolling facilities serving overseas military objectives.

In 2008, aviation teams under the NEDCTP received $36.3 million, mass transit teams received $5.5 million, air cargo inspection received $7 million, and Iraq Supplemental received $20 million (also air cargo). The NEDCTP director is in offices of the TSA headquarters in Arlington, Most training and evaluation is done at the Defense Military Working Dog School at Lackland Air Force Base near San Antonio (known to law enforcement nationwide as “dog school”).

Canine teams supplied by state and local law enforcement to airports and rail systems receive a TSA subsidy, capped at approximately $50,000 per year, but the state and local agencies must agree to devote 80% of the subsidized team’s time to the operational environment—i.e., to the airport or mass transit facility. About 500 state and local canine teams receive this support at present. The dogs one sees deployed at Penn Station in New York City may be wearing NYPD vests, but a significant part of the team’s expenses (including part of the officer’s salary) come from federal sources.

The GAO report describes the NEDCTP training as consisting of:

• Two months of learning to identify several explosive odors.
• A ten-week training course at Lackland where teams learn to detect explosive odors in environments such as aircraft and mass transit terminals, luggage, vehicles, cargo, and buildings.
• A two-month acclimation period.
• A 14-day “training mission” in an operational environment.

NEDCTP trains about 18 classes per year, each with 12 student teams, producing about 216 dogs annually. Dogs must be recertified annually. Some teams are taught to work “in maritime mode” for the U.S. Coast Guard.

The number of skilled canine teams is steadily increasing, and more will be certified through the end of 2010. To have an adequate number of dogs and personnel, the Department of Homeland Security cannot rely solely on dogs that it breeds at its Canine Breeding and Development Center, which began operations in 1999. Many dogs are acquired from the private sector or from nonprofit organizations. Although the number of dogs is increasing, only about six dogs at the average airport, and about six dogs per mass transit system, with most dogs working only one shift per day, means that the responsibilities of canine team are still spread quite thin.

Tuesday, May 18, 2010

Police Dogs Never Quit Even If They're Fired, or How to Ruin Your Daughter's Party

The alert of a narcotics detection dog can be a scary thing. In an aggressive alert, the dog might bark and growl, but it is generally at the end of a lead while the other end is being held a police handler.

Imagine your household pet suddenly alerting to strangers on the street, or guests in your home.

A resident of New Paltz obtained a large mixed breed dog from a local SPCA. Afraid the dog might run away, she asked her vet to chip the dog. The vet, before beginning the procedure, scanned the dog and found there was already a chip at the back of the dog’s neck.

This was a depressing discovery for the new owner. The dog had been lost and ended up in the pound. If the prior owner were found, she would have to return the dog. But a check of the chip number with the manufacturer revealed that the prior owner was the New York City Police Department, which had let the dog go as a cost-cutting measure. The dog was supposed to be placed in a home, according to an NYPD official, but something had apparently gone wrong. In any case, the city did not want the dog back. There was also no need to chip him, since the new owner’s contact information could be entered in the database of the chip manufacturer.

There were advantages to discovering the dog’s history. The new owner learned the dog was a Rottweiler-bloodhound mix and was told the dog’s name and age. The dog had been trained as a search and rescue dog but had also received basic police dog training, including narcotics detection training. The NYPD official explained what narcotics detection was and mentioned something about the dog having an alert for certain drugs.

Some months later, the owner’s daughter had a party. The teenagers were having a good time when a new boy arrived. After walking around the living room, the boy came close to the dog, which began growling. The dog backed the boy towards the front door, the growling getting louder as everyone became quiet. Frightened, the boy ran from the house.

The dog’s new owner remembered what she had heard about the dog’s brief training in narcotics detection and guessed the rest. She confronted the boy.

“Have you been smoking something?”

The boy admitted he had and she asked him to go home.

I wonder if police departments facing canine downsizing situations have realized the marketing potential of placing a narcotics detection dog. “Worried about your children smoking pot? A slightly used drug dog can keep your home drug-free!”

A cadaver dog, on the other hand, might not be such a good idea. You could learn more about what’s in your neighbors’ yards than would be good for you.

Sunday, May 16, 2010

U.S. v. Stevens, Animal Cruelty, and Proposed Legislation Criminalizing Sales of Animal Crush Videos

The U.S. criminal code, at 18 U.S.C. 48, imposed a fine and potential imprisonment for five years for anyone who “knowingly creates, sells, or possess a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate commerce or foreign commerce for commercial gain.” Exceptions were provided for a depiction that has “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, or artistic value.” A depiction of animal cruelty was defined as “any visual or auditory depiction, including any photograph, motion-picture film, video recording, electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of the State in which the creation, sale, or possession takes place, regardless of whether the maiming, mutilation, torture, wounding, or killing took place in the State.”

Congress particularly wanted to stop the market for “crush videos” sold to people with sexual fetishes, often showing women slowly crushing animals to death while wearing high heeled shoes. The actions depicted are prohibited under animal cruelty laws of probably every state. In the case that came before the U.S. Supreme Court, the prosecution was of Robert J. Stevens, who ran a business, Dogs of Velvet and Steel, which included an internet site with posted videos of pit bull fights from Japan, as well as older footage of dog fights from the U.S. that allegedly took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Stevens was indicted, and a federal district court jury convicted him of all counts. He was sentenced to 37 months in prison and appealed. The Third Circuit reversed, finding 18 U.S.C. 48 unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, in which seven justices joined. Only Samuel Alito dissented. The court’s conclusions were not based on approval of the acts shown in Stevens’ videos, but rather because he was convicted under a statute that might, sooner or later, be applied to restrict depictions of activities, such as hunting, that are not constitutionally prohibited, even if this was not the intention of the drafters of the statute. If a statute has such a potential for overbreadth, the unfortunate consequence is that the solution is to declare it invalid, meaning that Congress must try again before it can be used to convict anyone whose behavior could properly be outlawed.

Roberts acknowledged that as far back as 1641, the Massachusetts Bay Colony prohibited “Tirranny and Crueltie towards any bruite Creature which are usuallie kept for man’s use,” but noted this prohibited acts, not depictions of acts. 18 U.S.C. 48, Roberts notes, “nowhere requires that the depicted conduct be cruel” It criminalizes any depiction in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed.” Wounded and killed are problem words. Because of the fact that the act may not have to take place in a state for the depiction to be unlawful in that state, this means that a film of hunting in Montana that makes its way to the District of Columbia, where hunting is illegal, could result in a prosecution under the statute. (The District of Columbia, Puerto Ricko, the Virgin Islands, and Guam and other territories are states for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 48.)

The Government argued that it would not attempt enforcement in situations such as hunting, but Roberts concluded that the court could “not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.” Unfortunately, I agree with Roberts on this. It is too easy to imagine law school arguments against films about hunting being picked up by certain animal rights groups, then reaching the attention of a federal prosecutor who shares such views. What is extreme from one person’s view may be common sense from another’s. Bill Clinton, when signing 18 U.S.C. 48 into law in 1999, apparently conceived of it as precluding wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex, not as a ban on dog fight depictions. (Michael Vick’s troubles were still in the future.)

Justice Alito, in his dissent, observes that the majority decision has “the practical effect of legalizing the sale” of crush videos and “is likely to spur a resumption of their production.” Because there are enough morons out there who enjoy dog fighting or find crushing animals to be sexually thrilling, I am quite sure he is correct. Alito argues that hunting falls “comfortably within the exception set out in § 48(b).” I would like to think so, and it pains me to disagree with the only Justice who put animals first in this debate, but I believe that one has to take into account the extremes to which too many citizens are apt to push legal arguments (for any purpose they can justify).

U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010).

On April 21, Representative Elton Gallegly (R.-CA, including Ventura and Santa Barbara counties) introduced legislation (H.R. 5092) to outlaw crush videos. As of this writing it has 245 co-sponsors, meaning it will pass. It is presently being reviewed by the House Committee of the Judiciary, whose staff is no doubt making sure it can withstand a Supreme Court review. For a list of co-sponsors, see the Library of Congress website. Unfortunately, this legislation is drafted very narrowly, probably to assure it will pass, and prohibits depictions of animals "being intentionally crushed, burned, drowned, or impaled," which would seem not to cover videos of dog fights.

Justice Alito added an appendix to his dissent, summarizing state statutes prohibiting animal cruelty. Because it is a useful summary, I include it below:

Alaska Stat. §11.61.140(c)(4) (2008) (“It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the conduct of the defendant . . . was necessarily incidental to lawful fishing, hunting or trapping activities”)
Arizona Rev. Stat. Ann. §§13–2910(C)(1), (3) (West Supp. 2009) (“This section does not prohibit or restrict . . . [t]he taking of wildlife or other activities permitted by or pursuant to title 17 . . . [or] [a]ctivities regulated by the Arizona game and fish department or the Arizona department of agriculture”)

Arkansas Code Ann. §5–62–105(a) (Supp. 2009) (“This subchapter does not prohibit any of the following activities: . . . (9) Engaging in the taking of game or fish through hunting, trap-ping, or fishing, or engaging in any other activity authorized by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 35, by §15–41–101 et seq., or by any Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission regulation promulgated under either Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 35, or statute”)
California Penal Code Ann. §599c (West 1999) (“No part of this title shall be construed as interfering with any of the laws of this state known as the ‘game laws,’ . . . or to interfere with the right to kill all animals used for food”)

Colorado Rev. Stat. Ann. §18–9–201.5(2) (2009) (“In case of any conflict between this part 2 [prohibiting cruelty to animals] or section 35–43–126, [Colo. Rev. Stat.], and the wildlife statutes of the state, said wildlife statutes shall control”), §18–9–202(3) (“Nothing in this part 2 shall be construed to amend or in any manner change the authority of the wildlife commission, as established in title 33, [Colo. Rev. Stat.], or to prohibit any conduct therein authorized or permitted”)

Connecticut Gen. Stat. §53–247(b) (2009) (“Any person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, wounds or kills an animal shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years or both. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to . . . any person . . . while lawfully engaged in the taking of wildlife”)
Delaware Code Ann., Tit. 11, §1325(f) (2007) (“This section shall not apply to the lawful hunting or trapping of animals as provided by law”)

Florida Stat. §828.122(9)(b) (2007) (“This section shall not apply to . . . [a]ny person using animals to pursue or take wildlife or to participate in any hunting regulated or subject to being regulated by the rules and regulations of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission”)

Georgia Code Ann. §16–12–4(e) (2007) (“The provisions of this Code section shall not be construed as prohibiting conduct which is otherwise permitted under the laws of this state or of the United States, including, but not limited to . . . hunting, trapping, fishing, [or] wildlife management”)

Hawaii Rev. Stat. §711–1108.5(1) (2008 Cum. Supp.) (“A person commits the offense of cruelty to animals in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly tortures, mutilates, or poisons or causes the torture, mutilation, or poisoning of any pet animal or equine animal resulting in serious bodily injury or death of the pet animal or equine animal”)

Idaho Code §25–3515 (Lexis 2000) (“No part of this chapter shall be construed as interfering with, negating or preempting any of the laws or rules of the department of fish and game of this state . . . or to interfere with the right to kill,slaughter, bag or take all animals used for food”)

Illinois Comp. Stat., ch. 510, §70/13 (West 2006) (“In case of any alleged conflict between this Act . . . and the ‘Wildlife Code of Illinois’ or ‘An Act to define and require the use of humane methods in the handling, preparation for slaughter, and slaughter of livestock for meat or meat products to be offered for sale’, . . . the provisions of those Acts shall prevail”), §70/3.03(b)(1) (“For the purposes of this Section, ‘animal torture’ does not include any death, harm, or injury caused to any animal by . . . any hunting, fishing, trap-ping, or other activity allowed under the Wild-life Code, the Wildlife Habitat Management Areas Act, or the Fish and Aquatic Life Code” (footnotes omitted))

Indiana Code §35–46–3–5(a) (West 2004) (subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, “this chapter [prohibiting “Offenses Relating to Animals”] does not apply to . . . [f]ishing, hunting, trapping, or other conduct authorized under [Ind. Code §]14–22”)

Iowa Code §717B.2(5) (2009) (“This section [banning “animal abuse”] shall not apply to . . . [a] person taking, hunting, trapping, or fishing for a wild animal as provided in chapter 481A”), §717B.3A(2)(e) (“This section [banning “animal torture”] shall not apply to . . . [a] person taking, hunting, trapping, or fishing for a wild animal as provided in chapter 481A”)

Kansas Stat. Ann. §21–4310(b)(3) (2007) (“The provisions of this section shall not apply to . . . killing, attempting to kill, trapping, catching or taking of any animal in accordance with the provisions of chapter 32 [Wildlife, Parks and Recreation] or chapter 47 [Livestock and Domestic Animals] of the Kansas Statutes Annotated”)

Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. §§525.130(2)(a), (e) (Lexis 2008) (“Nothing in this section shall apply to the killing of animals . . . [p]ursuant to a license to hunt, fish, or trap . . . [or] [f]or purposes relating to sporting activities”), §525.130(3) (“Activities of animals engaged in hunting, field trials, dog training other than training a dog to fight for pleasure or profit, and other activities authorized either by a hunting license or by the Department of Fish and Wildlife shall not constitute a violation of this section”)

Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:102.1(C)(1) (West Supp. 2010) (“This Section shall not apply to . . . [t]he lawful hunting or trapping of wildlife as provided by law”)

Maine Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §1031(1)(G) (West Supp. 2009) (providing that hunting and trap-ping an animal is not a form of prohibited animal cruelty if “permitted pursuant to” parts of state code regulating the shooting of large game, inland fisheries, and wildlife)

Maryland Crim. Law Code Ann. §10–603(3) (Lexis 2002) (“Sections 10–601 through 10–608 of this subtitle do not apply to . . . an activity that may cause unavoidable physical pain to an animal, including . . . hunting, if the person performing the activity uses the most humane method reasonably available”)

Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. §§750.50(11)(a), (b) (West Supp. 2009) (“This section does not prohibit the lawful killing or other use of an animal, including . . . [f]ishing . . . [h]unting, [or]trapping [as regulated by state law]”), §750.50b(9)(a), (b) (“This section does not pro-hibit the lawful killing or other use of an animal, including . . . [f]ishing . . . [h]unting, [or]trapping [as regulated by state law]”)

Missouri Rev. Stat. §578.007(3) (2000) (“The provisions of sections 578.005 to 578.023 shall not apply to . . . [h]unting, fishing, or trapping as allowed by” state law)

Montana Code Ann. §45–8–211(4)(d) (2009) (“This section does not prohibit . . . lawful fishing, hunting, and trapping activities”)

Nebraska Rev. Stat. §28–1013(4) (2008) (exempting “[c]ommonly accepted practices of hunting, fishing, or trapping”)

Nevada Rev. Stat. §§574.200(1), (3) (2007) (provisions of Nevada law banning animal cruelty “do not . . . [i]nterfere with any of the fish and game laws . . . [or] the right to kill all animals and fowl used for food”)

New Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. §644:8(II) (West Supp. 2009) (“In this section, ‘animal’ means a domes-tic animal, a household pet or a wild animal in captivity”)

New Jersey Stat. Ann. §4:22–16(c) (West 1998) (“Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to prohibit or interfere with . . . [t]he shooting or taking of game or game fish in such manner and at such times as is allowed or provided by the laws of this State”)

New Mexico Stat. Ann. §30–18–1(I)(1) (Supp. 2009) (“The provisions of this section do not apply to . . . fishing, hunting, falconry, taking and trap-ping”)

New York Agric. & Mkts. Law Ann. §353–a(2) (West 2004) (“Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit or interfere in any way with anyone lawfully engaged in hunting, trap-ping, or fishing”)

North Carolina Gen. Stat. Ann. §14–360(c)(1) (Lexis 2009) (“[T]his section shall not apply to . . . [t]he lawful taking of animals under the jurisdiction and regulation of the Wildlife Resources Com-mission . . .”)

North Dakota Cent. Code Ann. §36–21.1–01(5)(a) (Lexis Supp. 2009) (“ ‘Cruelty’ or ‘torture’ . . . does not include . . . [a]ny activity that requires a licenseor permit under chapter 20.1–03 [which governs gaming and other licenses]”)
Oregon Rev. Stat. §167.335 (2007) (“Unless gross negligence can be shown, the provisions of [certain statutes prohibiting animal cruelty] do not apply to . . . (7) [l]awful fishing, hunting and trapping activities”)

Pennsylvania, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5511(a)(3)(ii) (2008) (“This subsection [banning killing, maiming, or poison-ing of domestic animals or zoo animals] shall not apply to . . . the killing of any animal or fowl pursuant to . . . The Game Law”), §5511(c)(1) (“A person commits an offense if he wantonly or cruelly ill-treats, overloads, beats, otherwise abuses any animal, or neglects any animal as to which he has a duty of care”)

Rhode Island Gen. Laws §4–1–3(a) (Lexis 1998) (prohibiting “[e]very owner, possessor, or person having the charge or custody of any animal” from engaging in certain acts of unnecessary cruelty), §§4–1–5(a), (b) (prohibiting only “[m]alicious” injury to or killing of animals and further providing that “[t]his section shall not apply to licensed hunters during hunting season or a licensed business killing animals for human consumption”)

South Carolina Code Ann. §47–1–40(C) (Supp. 2009) (“This section does not apply to . . . activity authorized by Title 50 [consisting of laws on Fish, Game,and Watercraft]”)

South Dakota Codified Laws §40–1–17 (2004) (“The acts and conduct of persons who are lawfully engaged in any of the activities authorized by Title 41 [Game, Fish, Parks and Forestry] . . . and persons who properly kill any animal used for food and sport hunting, trapping, and fishing as authorized by the South Dakota Department of Game, Fish and Parks, are exempt from the provisions of this chapter”)

Tennessee Code Ann. §39–14–201(1) (2010 Supp.) (“ ‘Animal’ means a domesticated living creature or a wild creature previously captured”), §39–14–201(4) (“[N]othing in this part shall be construed as prohibiting the shooting of birds or game for the purpose of human food or the use of animate targets by incorporated gun clubs”)

Texas Penal Code Ann. §42.092(a)(2) (West Supp. 2009) (“ ‘Animal’ means a domesticated living creature, including any stray or feral cat or dog, and a wild living creature previously captured. The term does not include an uncaptured wild living creature or a livestock animal”),§42.092(f)(1)(A) (“It is an exception to the application of this section that the conduct engaged in by the actor is a generally accepted and otherwise lawful . . . form of conduct occurring solely for the purpose of or in support of . . . fishing, hunting, or trapping”)

Utah Code Ann. §76–9–301(1)(b)(ii)(D) (Lexis 2008) (“ ‘Animal’ does not include . . . wildlife, as defined in Section 23–13–2, including protected and unprotected wildlife, if the conduct toward the wildlife is in accordance with lawful hunting, fishing, or trapping practices or other lawful practices”), §76–9–301(9)(C) (“This section does not affect or prohibit . . . the lawful hunting of, fishing for, or trapping of, wildlife”)

Vermont Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §351b(1)(2009) (“This subchapter shall not apply to . . . activities regulated by the department of fish and wildlife pursuant to Part 4 of Title 10”)

Virginia Code Ann. §3.2–6570D (Lexis 2008) (“This section shall not prohibit authorized wildlife management activities or hunting, fishing or trapping [as regulated by state law]”)

Washington Rev. Code §16.52.180 (2008) (“No part of this chapter shall be deemed to interfere with any of the laws of this state known as the ‘game laws’ . . . or to interfere with the right to kill animals to be used for food”)

West Virginia Code Ann. §61–8–19(f) (Lexis Supp. 2009) (“The provisions of this section do not apply to lawful acts of hunting, fishing, [or] trapping”)

Wisconsin Stat. §951.015(1) (2007–2008) (“This chap-ter may not be interpreted as controverting any law regulating wild animals that are subject to regulation under ch. 169 [regulating, among other things, hunting], [or] the taking of wild animals”)

Wyoming Stat. Ann. §6–3–203(m)(iv) (2009) (“Nothing in subsection (a), (b) or (n) of this section shall be construed to prohibit . . . [t]he hunting,capture or destruction of any predatory animal or other wildlife in any manner not otherwise prohibited by law”)